Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein + comments  by Maarten Maartensz     



1.2 The world consists of facts.

Facts are presumably what is represented by true statements. This is fairly clear for ordinary cases, in natural language: Copper is a metal, copper conducts electricity, London is the capital of Great Britain etc.

But it is not very clear for other cases, and anyway one may ask: Why not rather events or processes, since these involve time in some sense, which seems involved in all real things, or why not, if one wants to get abstract or general, why not of structures or classes of things, perhaps of some (natural) kinds?

In brief, what W. seems to do here is (1) to analyze the world as if it is what corresponds to statements, and (2) without considering terms, and indeed what these may stand for, such as things, events, structures, or processes, for W. seems to relegate these under "facts".

It seems to me that this is too simplistic an analysis.