Even today, at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the process of charting
the brain’s intricate functioning has barely begun. As Rita
Carter writes in her book Mapping the Mind, ‘the vision
of the brain we have now is probably no more complete or
accurate than a sixteenth-century map of the world.'
Richard Webster:
Freud, Charcot and hysteria: lost
in the labyrinth
|
"I am actually not
at all a man of science, not an observer, not an experimenter,
not a thinker. I am by temperament nothing but a
conquistador--an adventurer, if you want it translated--with all
the curiosity, daring, and tenacity characteristic of a man of
this sort"
(Sigmund
Freud, letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Feb. 1, 1900). |
The opening quote states a point of view I reached myself
independently in the seventies and eighties, when I studied philosophy
and psychology, hoping and expecting to become eventually a
philosopher of science and a logician. This did not work out
because
of ME - I think it is fair to say, since quite a few who should know
were impressed by my intellect.
Also, the webpages of Richard Webster are interesting for those who
want some clear explanations of what Freud, and indeed psychiatry, is
about for the most part, in informed and clear English also.
I come to these in my third section, since in the first two I give
at least an outline of my own philosophical and methodological
assumptions, continuing in fact what I wrote the last two days about
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and its DSM-5, that I hope
will finish this association as soon as possible, since it clearly is
not rational, not moral, not scientific and not honest:
1. Natural
Philosophy - foundations of rational philosophy and science
2. Philosophy of science - foundations science and methodology
3. Some links about psychiatry
Note please that in good scientific theorizing as foundation there is a
many-layered structure, that in fact has been built up by mathematicians,
physicists, and scientifically oriented philosophers since Galileo Galileo laid
the real foundations of modern rational empirical science:
It starts with a general philosophy, usually followed by a philosophy of science
of the specific science someone is interested in, combined if done well with
introductions to mathematics, mathematical logic, and probability theory and
statistics, which in turn is followed by the more specific methodological
problems and techniques of the science.
This can be given and has been done for real sciences like physics and
chemistry, starting for serious in the 19th Century by Faraday, Mill, Whewell,
Peirce, Jevons, Clifford, Hertz and continued in the 20th by Poincaré, Russell,
Keynes, Johnson, Broad, Campbell, and Carnap: See section 2 for some relevant
texts.
None of this was done for psychology, with a few partial exceptions, and
especially in the 19th Century notably Peirce, James and Helmholtz - who unlike
later psychologists and psychiatrists really knew real science - and it was not
done for psychiatry either, at least if one speaks of foundations informed by
real scientific knowledge.
The reasons this was not done are, among others: (1) that psychology and
psychiatry were far less well-developed when institutionalized as "sciences" in
universities, in which one could be taught, and receive degrees in, than were
physics, chemistry and mathematics; (2) that psychology and psychiatry are far
more complicated than physics and chemistry, which are many orders of complexity
less; and (3) that very soon both psychology and psychiatry were torn apart by
competing schools, that disagreed down to the very foundations, methods and
presuppositions of the supposed sciences.
In any case, here follow some of my own assumptions and background when I think
about and discuss psychiatry and psychology, that for me are for the most part
as yet not real sciences, for the quoted reason mostly, since both these
sciences are essentially about the human brain:
‘the vision of the brain we have now is probably no more complete or
accurate than a sixteenth-century map of the world.'
(Rita Carter)
This fact is not, itself, the fault of psychologists or psychiatrists: The human
brain seems the most complex organ nature has produced, and most of the
fundamentals about how it works its miracles - consciousness, sentience,
morality, free will (or its strong illusion), seeing colours, young love in
spring, playing, speaking languages, composing and enjoying great music and art,
doing mathematics, cooperating to make a humane society - lies hidden in the
dark to this day.
What is the fault of psychologists or psychiatrists, and especially clinical
psychologists and clinical psychiatrists, that is, the breeds that treat
patients for money, are their lies and pretensions about knowledge and insight
into others' minds that they cannot possibly have themselves, or at least not
based on any known science or any known rational evidence:
For none of the things I mentioned - consciousness, sentience, morality,
free will (or its strong illusion), seeing colours, young love in spring,
playing, speaking languages, composing and enjoying great music and art, doing
mathematics, cooperating to make a humane society - there is anything in the way
of a full and satisfying rational explanation that is based on intersubjectively
widely accepted and repeatable evidence, and for most, including thinking,
feeling, and learning in a human way, there is hardly a start and also not even
much good evidence.
In any case... here are some outlines of rational foundations for rational
science:
1. Natural
Philosophy - foundations of rational philosophy and science
|
1. General
Introduction: definition "Philosophy"
2.
The
fundamental problem of presuppositions
3.
Natural Language
4. Natural Logic
5.
Natural Realism
6. Scientific Realism
1. General
Introduction
Philosophy: Etymologically,
from the Greek "love of wisdom".
The Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles
tells us philosophy is
1.
(In the original and widest
sense.) The love, study, or pursuit of wisdom, or of knowledge of things and
their causes, whether theoretical or practical.
2.
That more advanced study, to
which, in the mediaeval universities, the seven liberal arts were
introductory; it included the three branches of natural, moral, and
metaphysical philosophy, commonly called the three philosophies.
3.
(= natural p.) The knowledge or
study of natural objects and phenomena; now usu. called 'science'.
4.
(= moral p.) The knowledge or
study of the principles of human action or conduct; ethics.
5.
(= metaphysical p.) That
department of knowledge or study that deals with ultimate reality, or with
the most general causes and principles of things. (Now the most usual
sense.)
6.
Occas. used esp. of knowledge
obtained by natural reason, in contrast with revealed knowledge.
7.
With of: The study of the
general principles of some particular branch of knowledge, experience or
activity; also, less properly, of any subject or phenomenon.
8.
A philosophical system or
theory.
9.
a. The system which a person
forms for the conduct of life. b. The mental attitude or habit of a
philosopher; serenity, resignation; calmness of temper.
This is as clear a definition as any, and
I shall presume it for
my subject.
2. The fundamental problem of presuppositions
If we want to know or study "ultimate reality"
(whatever that will turn out to be), what may we or may we not
presuppose? This is a relevant question, if only because it
seems that whatever we do presuppose will have some influence on
whatever we come to conclude while also it seems we cannot conclude
anything without presupposing something: To reach any conclusion one
needs some assumption(s).
It is clear
that any human philosophy is the product of people who already know
and suppose something, in particular some Natural Language to reason
and communicate with. So any human
being concerned with philosophy uses and presumes in some sense some
Natural Language.
3. Natural
Language:
Set of
symbols that can
be combined into statements,
questions and stories, to convey
information and
represent anything whatsoever that can be
thought about,
experienced or imagined.
This allows the users of a natural language to frame philosophical questions and provide philosophical answers, and it is also clear that each
and every human being that speaks a natural language therewith has a means to
claim about any of its statements that it is true or not true, credible or
not, necessary or not, and much more ("probable",
"plausible", "politically correct", "sexist",
"morally desirable" a.s.o.)
There
are other definitions of natural language, but one essential point about
it is that it is a distinctively human gift, and is - together with
mathematics, that is also at least conveyed
and expressed by language - what makes human beings different from other
animals. Almost everything that makes human beings specifically human rests on
the skill of natural language, that any healthy neonate can pick up in a few
years by being exposed to speakers of the language.
For the purpose of doing philosophy, in the sense
seriously attempting to ask and answer general questions, some natural
language must be considered given, for without it there simply are no
questions to pose or answer. And indeed, all philosophy, including
philosophies that conclude there is no human knowledge, in fact presumes some
natural language.
This is itself a fact of some philosophical
importance that is often disregarded. One of its important applications is to
show that people who propound skeptical arguments to the effect that human
beings cannot know anything, or cannot know anything with certainty, or
cannot know anything with more or less probability than its denial (these are
three somewhat different versions of skepticism, that also has other variants
that are less easy to refute) must be mistaken, since they all presuppose
some natural language known well enough to state claims that nothing can be
known.
It should also be noted with some care that a
natural language is not given to human beings in a completely clear, perfect
and obvious way (since, for example, it is very difficult to clearly
articulate the rules of grammar one does use automatically and correctly when
speaking it), but it is given to start with as a tool for communication and
expression that may be improved and questioned, and that enables one to pose
and answer questions of any kind.
Natural language is, in other and somewhat technical
words, a heuristic, i.e. something that helps one find out things. What other
heuristics do come with being human?
Every Natural Language includes many terms and many -
usually not very explicit and articulated - rules that enable its users to
represent their experiences, and to reason or argue with themselves or others.
We shall call this body of terms and rules Natural Logic:
4.
Natural
Logic:
A collection of
terms and
rules that come with Natural Language that allows us to
reason
and argue in it.
In any Natural Language there are the elements of what may be called
its Natural Logic:
Examples of
such logical terms are: "and", "or",
"not", "true", "false", "if",
"therefore", "every", "some",
"necessary", "possible", "therefore", "is the same as",
"any (arbitrary)" and "one (specific)", and
quite a few more. Examples of such
logical rules, that are here formulated in terms of what one may write
down on the strength of what one already has written down (pretending
for the moment that natural language is written rather than spoken)
are: "If one has written down that if one statement is true then
another statement is true, and if one has written down that the one
statement is true, then one may write down (in conclusion) that the
other statement is true" (thus: "if it rains then it gets
wet and it rains, therefore it gets wet") and "If one has
written down that every so-and-so is such-and-such, and this is a
so-and-so, then one may write down that this is a such-and-such"
(thus: "if every Greek is human and Socrates is a Greek,
therefore Socrates is human").
We presuppose
Natural Logic in much the same way as we presuppose Natural Language:
as something we have to start with and precisify later, and that may
well come to be revised or extended quite seriously, but also as
something that at least seems to be in part given in more or less the
same way to any able speaker of a Natural Language: In it there are a
considerable number of
terms and - usually implicit -
rules which
enable every speaker of the language to argue and reason, that every
speaker knows and has extensive experience with.
Again, it
does not follow that these rules and terms are clear or sacrosanct.
All that I assume is that they come with Natural Language and are to
some extent articulated in Natural Language and understood and
presupposed by everyone who uses Natural Language.
Three very
fundamental assumptions about the making of assumptions that come with
Natural Logic are as follows - where it should be noted I am not
stating these assumptions with more precision than may be supposed
here and now:
1. Nothing can be argued without
the making of assumptions.
2. An assumption is a statement
that is supposed to be true.
3. Human beings are free to
assume whatever they please.
These I
suppose to be true statements about
arguments and people arguing,
where it should be noted that especially the third assumption,
factually correct though it seems to be, has been widely denied in
human history for political, religious, philosophical or
ideological reasons: In
most places, at most times, people have not been allowed to speak
publicly about all assumptions they can make.
Four other assumptions about
argumentation that should be mentioned here are:
1. Conclusions are statements that are inferred in arguments from earlier
assumptions and conclusions by means of assumptions called
rules of inference, that state which kinds of statements may
be concluded from the assumption of which kinds of statements
2. Definitions of terms are assumptions to the effect that a certain term may
be substituted by a certain other term in a certain kind of
arguments
3. Rational
argumentation about a topic starts with explicating rules of
inference, assumptions and definitions of terms, and proceeds
with the adding of conclusions only if these do follow by some
assumed rule of inference.
4. A statement is
true precisely if what it says is in
fact
the case.
The first two
assumptions need more clarification than will be given here and now,
but, on the other hand, again every speaker of a Natural Language will
have some understanding of setting up arguments in terms of
assumptions, definitions and
rules of inference, and drawing
conclusions from these
assumptions and definitions by means of these
rules of inference.
The third
assumption, when compared with the normal practice of people arguing,
entails that mostly people do not argue very rationally, at least in
the sense that all too often they rely in their arguments on rules of
inference, assumptions or definitions they have not explicitly assumed
yet have used in the course of the argument. (Often such assumptions
are made because of
wishful
thinking.)
The fourth
assumption is in fact a definition of the term "true" that expresses
an idea that is older than Aristotle, who seems to have been the
first to formulate it clearly and stress its central importance. It needs also more explanation than
will be given here and now, but it seems to clearly express the
meaning of "true" people use when they discuss ideas about reality
that are personally important to them.
5. Natural
Realism:
A minimal
metaphysics
that most human beings share may be called Natural Realism and stated
in terms of the following fundamental
assumptions:
-
There is one
reality
that exists apart from what
human beings think
and
feel
about it.
-
This reality is made up of
kinds
of
things
which have
properties
and stand in
relations.
-
Some of these things, properties and relations are
invariant, at least for some time, and therefore
predictable.
-
Human beings form part of that reality and have
experiences
and
fantasies about it that originate in it.
-
All
living human beings have
beliefs
and
desires
about many real
and unreal
entities, that are about what they
think
is the case in reality and
should be the case
in reality.
-
All living human beings have very
similar or identical
feelings,
sensations
and
beliefs
and
desires
in many ordinary similar or identical
circumstances.
Some assumption like natural realism is at the basis of human social
interaction, at the basis of the law, and at the basis of
promises,
contracts and agreements, while the last of the assumptions I used to
characterize Natural Realism amounts to an assumption of a
shared human nature.
We shall assume Natural Realism is also at the basis of
philosophy,
at least initially, firstly, because we must assume something
to conclude anything; secondly, because even if we - now or eventually
- disagree with Natural Realism it helps to try to state clearly what
it amounts to; and thirdly, because it does seem an assumption like
that of Natural Realism is involved in much human
reasoning about
themselves and others, and about language,
meaning and
reality.
Finally, since this implies not only a logical and rational approach
to knowledge
but also an empirical and scientific approach, we assume, to start
with, and until we have found better rules, next to logic, Newton's "Rules
of Reasoning" in his "Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy".
6.
Scientific realism:
The thesis that human beings all are part of one and the same
reality that is
most successfully known, understood, explained and changed by
scientific
methods.
Note that there are other ways of trying to understand or
influence nature, such as
religion, superstition and
magic, which tend
to have claims and results that are only believed by the
faithful in such
things (see:
Wishful thinking), and that there are other ways of trying to understand or influence
human beings, namely by art, intuition, imaginatively taking their place,
or talking or living with them.
This Philosophical Dictionary
is written mostly from a point of view that is fairly described as
scientific realism, in the sense defined. See also:
Natural Realism.
See also:
First Assumptions,
Natural Logic,
Natural Philosophy,
Natural Realism,
Metaphysics,
Minimal metaphysics,
Personalism,
Rationality,
Representing,
Science,
Basic Logic - semantics
|
2. Philosophy of science - foundations science and
methodology
And now for something
completetely different... good modern philosophy
texts. As it happens, I give only texts that fall within the
traditions of philosophy of science, analytical philosophy or
methodology, and for a good reason: Only these - for the most
part - make rational sense. Also, I am using the text of my
Ten
good modern philosophy texts of 2009
So yes, good books of philosophy exist - and yes, like
almost all good things, they are rare, and they deserve to be
known and savoured, so in this piece I will name some really good
modern philosophy books and briefly say why I think they are.
But first I should say what is a
"modern philosophy text". As I wish to use the term, at least in
this piece, it is a text about philosophy that was published
since 1900 and that is not postmodern.
This is not quite as the term is
used normally, for in terms of
philosophical periods, the modern period starts around 1600,
but I do not want to consider books from that period, but only
from the last century or so, and also I have used "modern" in
opposition to "postmodern",
for I think the last school of philosophy is not real but
bogus philosophy - a kind of
nihilism with pretensions and media appeal, but related to real
philosophy and real science as are journalism and prostitution
related to the subjects of real wisdom and real love.
Also, it should be mentioned in
this context that "philosophy", broadly and vaguely speaking, but
precisely enough for the moment, was a rather different sort of
thing in the 20th Century, in the West at least, than in earlier
centuries, and for several reasons, that deserve to be listed in
part, for they are somewhat curious and interesting.
First, there was much more of
philosophy about and around in the 20th century (again in the
West, especially, but this I will leave tacitly understood in the
rest of this text), for four different sort of reasons:
- There was much more freedom
to discuss philosophies of all kinds (including religions for
the moment) freely than in previous centuries.
- There was much more attention
paid to philosophies of many kinds in the daily and periodical
press and media, that only came into existence in the end of
the 19th Century.
- Practical implementations of
the politicial philosophies of fascism and communism ruled
dictatorially in large countries over many millions (and
appealed to many millions outside these dictatorships).
- Philosophy was taught as a
special subject on a much wider scale in the universities than
ever before, which fuelled the printing of lots more books
about philosophy than in previous centuries.
The first two points are -
perhaps - somewhat ephemeral or fleeting, in the sense that a
public, and especially a public with daily public media, may
discuss much and may even do so heatedly without this making much
of a real difference, but they do constitute a real difference
with earlier centuries.
The third point was of
fundamental political, social and human importance, as it ruined
the lives and chances of many millions, and shows that
philosophy really is of practical importance - but it also is
about philosophy run insane, or dictatorial or populist, which is
practically and politically important, but not cognitively so,
which is what I am concerned with here.
The fourth point means that
there was in fact a flood of philosophy books of all
kinds, schools, contents and qualities published in the 20th
Century, of which any one person can have read only a small
fraction.
Note that much of this -
probably by far the greatest part - was not so much serious
philosophy as serious publishing: There was a market for
it, unlike in previous centuries, either because it had become
fashionable for - would be - intellectuals to be informed about
philosophy or to have philosophical opinions or because it
catered to philosophy courses in Western universities.
As it happens, I believe that I
have read more modern philosophy than almost anyone. There must
be some who have read more, but (i) they are very probably
professionally employed as teachers of philosophy at some
university and especially (ii) it is unlikely they have read as
widely as I have, for professional philosophers tend to be
well read only in their own academic specialisms, and not outside
it.
As it happens also, although I
have read widely in modern philosophy, I have read critically,
and
the modern philosophy I like (or indeed: can take seriously)
is almost always of the analytical, scientific and
realistic kind, since only that kind of modern philosophy
may hope to escape Hume's severe judgment that most philosophy is
little better than sophistries and illusions, that are designed
to make life seem bearable or worthwile, rather than being
designed to further finding the
truth about
things.
So here is a brief list of
good philosophical texts in English, followed by some
explanations why I think they are good and deserve reading.
I'll list them in the order from introductory to demanding,
and give summaries below:
1. Nagel & Cohen: Introduction to
Logic and Scientific Method
This is an introductory
university text for beginning students and interested laymen that
dates back to the 1930ies, and that has been published and
republished in various formats until, at least, the 1970ies. The
edition I mean is the full edition, that gives a readable
and basic if today also somewhat old-fashioned introduction to
logic and philosophy of science, including the foundations of
probability theory and statistics.
It is in some ways definitely
out of date, but it does give a good and clear introduction to
realistic, analytical and scientific philosophy, without being
partial or excessively formal, and it also does a good job of
relating philosophy to science and to daily life.
2. Klaus & Kuntz: Philosophy: The Study of
Alternative Beliefs
Klaus & Kuntz is another introductory university text for
beginning students of philosophy, and has the merits of being
clear, fair and well done. Like Nagel & Cohen it will not impose
logical or mathematical technicalities on you, and it also does a
good job of relating philosophy to science and to daily life.
Overall, this seems to me to be
the best introduction to philosophy in one volume that I have
read, especially because of its clarity, fairness and scope.
3. Russell: History of Western
Philosophy
Russell's History of Western Philosophy is reputed to be partial
(to Russell and to analytical philosophy), unscholarly (Russell
didn't know Greek) and superficial (less than a 1000 pages), but
it has the great merits of being well-written, easily readable,
being the only introduction to philosophy or its history that
made me laugh, and to do its job, namely to give a survey of
Western philosophy in one book, by one mind, quite well.
There are better systematic
introductions to the subject, but they are not better written or
more readable, and if all you want is a readable and adequate
survey of the field, this is a fine text.
4. Russell: Human Knowledge - Its scope
and its limits
Russell's Human Knowledge - Its Scope and Limits, in fact was his
last serious book about philosophy, and was not well received,
because it did not fit in well or at all with the dominant
philosophical schools at the time, which were forms of fairly
crude but very pretentions neo-positivism or linguistic
philosophy.
Also, later this text was not
widely read, because it was considered old-fashioned, mistaken,
or not of the right neo-positivist (empirical) or linguistic
kind, but it seems to me a good and interesting statement and
discussion of its subject, written by a philosopher who, unlike
most modern philosophers, could write and who did know science.
So far, the books I have been
mentioning and commenting were (mostly) introductory texts. The
same holds for the following two, except that these are a little
more demanding, especially as regards mathematics
5. Hawkins: The Language of Nature
Hawkins' book is a very fine text on philosophy of science and its
relation to mathematics. It was written by someone who was
neither a professional philosopher nor a professional
mathematician, but who was also, according to Stanislav Ulam, who
was a great mathematician, "the best amateur mathematician I
know". In result, the book is a lot better than most books by
"real" (that is "professional") philosophers of science or
mathematicians on the subject.
It also is well-written and
clear, and the only setback I can think of is that it may require
some interest and knowledge of mathematics to savour and
comprehend it fully.
6. Toraldo
di Franca: The investigation of the
physical world
Toraldo di Franca's book is a fine text
that is mostly about the philosophies of science and of physics,
that was written by an Italian physicist. It has the merits of
being very clear and of discussing rather a lot of the
fundamental ideas of physics quite sensibly and the only setback
I can think of is that it may require some interest and knowledge
of mathematics to understand all of it.
7. Broad: The Mind and its Place in Nature
Broad's text is probably still the best introduction to its
subject - philosophy of mind - in one book, although it dates
back to the 1920ies. It was written by a very capable English
philosopher, who also had good groundings in mathematics and
science, and who wrote very clearly and fairly.
If the book has a setback
(besides not referring to literature written after it), it may be
that it is an impressively fat tome, but that setback is balanced
by Broad's excellent common sense and very readable and clear
style. If you are interested in the subject at all (also if you
are not a philosopher), this is a text you should read.
8. Burtt: The metaphysical foundations
of modern science
Burtt wrote a number of books relating to philosophy and
religion that are all worth reading, because he had a fine mind,
a clear style, and a fair manner of exposition, but the book I
name is the book that made him well-known, and deservedly so.
The book discusses, with many
quotations, especially the precursors of Newton in England, and
makes many points relating to the philosophies of science and of
physics that tend to be not discussed in other texts relating to
these subjects. It really clarifies the subject of its title, and
if it has a setback it must be that it discusses the
contributions to philosophy of very interesting and able
scientific men like Boyle that are not often discussed in
philosophy texts.
I have finally arrived at the
last two texts, and these differ from the ones I have mentioned
so far in at least four important respects:
- First, these are not
single books, but collections of books with the same
title and subject, of which the number depends on the edition
one uses.
- Second, these are texts that
are mostly addressed to specialists, notably philosophers of
science, mathematicians, and physicists.
- Third, these texts require
some minimal grounding and abilities in mathematics and logic
(though especially Stegmueller's texts explain a considerable
amount of this quite well).
- Fourth, these texts treat a
lot of material, in a somewhat encyclopedic way, and indeed are
meant to be handbooks of some kind, where one can find many
fundamentals of many subjects.
9. Stegmueller: Probleme und Resultaten der
analytischen und Wissenschaftsphilosophie
Stegmueller - the title means: Problems and results of analytical
philosophy and philosophy of science - I only know in German and
in the form of rather a lot of paperbound so-called
Studienausgabe, but it seems to have been originally in four
thick clothbound volumes, that also have been translated into
English. It has the great merits of being
an excellent summary of
and introduction to its subjects, and it also gives a fine survey
of it, and explains a lot about the foundations of
logic and
probability, that tend to be difficult to find elsewhere.
Of all the texts I mention in
this piece, this is most scholarly, the longest, and the most
technical, but it also teaches its readers a lot about many
things. The only setbacks I can think of are that, taken
together, it is a lot of text, if one reads all, although that is
not at all necessary, for the volumes can be mostly read
independently (*); that it is quite thorough,
which has the advantage of explaining lots of things quite well
that other texts don't explain at all (especially as regards
logic, probability and statistics); and that it is written in
scholarly German, which in this case means that it usually
is quite clear but normally is not exhilirating reading.
However... if you really
want to learn about the foundations of philosophy, science,
mathematics, logic, probability theory or statistics, this
is the text to turn to, for it explains much of this really well,
and also with full references.
10. Bunge: Treatise on Basic Philosophy
Bunge is an Argentinian
theoretical physicist and philosopher, of a pronounced realistic
and scientific bend in philosophy, that I like a lot. He wrote
many books, that also are recommendable, but his main work in
philosophy is bound to be the text I mentioned, which comes in
some ten paperback volumes (as I have them), and fundamentally
states his own philosophy, which is realistic, scientific,
strongly related to physics, and very informed about science and
physics.
I like Bunge's Treatise a lot,
but I am aware of the setbacks: One must know something about
both science and philosophy to appreciate them; taken
collectively, it is a lot of text; it is - unavoidably so -
somewhat dogmatic in parts; and it contains printing mistakes,
especially in formulas; and to understand it (and correct the
printing mistakes) one needs a fairly good grounding in logic and
mathematics (for which see Stegmueller).
On the other hand, it is a
relief to read a knowledgeable and bright physicist about science
and philosophy, rather than a dimwitted and pretentious
philosopher, and it gives a lot of background, general ideas,
summaries, points of view, and clearly stated principles and
assumptions, that also seem mostly sound and sensible to me, also
if I did not quite agree. And no other twentieth century
philosopher I know of did something like this, on Bunge's scale,
with his thoroughness - to which it may be added that he also has
the merit of writing a clear and readable English.
Summing up: The above
gives a list of useful, interesting, generally well written books
about philosophy, all written in the 20th Century, all well worth
reading, all informed, that ought to keep you from the streets
for half a year at least, if you were to decide to read them all,
and spend most of your time on them, and work through them all.
I did so myself, but not
in half a year, and not consecutively, but in the course of some
40 years of reading in and around philosophy and science. Much of
what I think I have learned about these subjects is to be found
somewhere in these books, usually well explained and with clear
references.
So... if you really want
to acquire some philosophical knowledge and competence, I have
herewith sketched a path towards it, and my final recommendations
of the path I indicated is that none of the above books was
written by a narrow specialist or for narrow specialists; all are
at least tolerably well written; all will teach you things you
did not know before; while the general sum-up of all is that
real philosophy - the trying to solve or clarify fundamental
problems - is these days mostly done by real scientists or
real mathematicians, and not by academic
philosophers.
And for those who really want to know: There is more on
lines like the above in my
Review of Books relating to philosophy in my Philosophical
Dictionary, with a discussion of 20th-Century philosophers and
their books in
Books - 20th C.
For psychologists and psychiatrists: If you do not
know at least the full text of
Wolfgang Stegmüller's
(the link is to the Wikipedia article on him) and his co-workers
great 4-volume work (also available in quite a few socalled
"Studienausgabe", following below with their original dates of
publication and their German titles, my position is that you are
not really qualified, not really competent, and in fact are
bullshitting anyone you lecture on the foundations of psychology
or psychiatry:
Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschafttheorie und
Analytischen Philosophie
- Band I, Erklärung-Begründung-Kausalität, 1983
- Band II, Theorie und Erfahrung, 1974
- 1. Teilband: Theorie und Erfahrung, 1974
- 2. Teilband: Theorienstrukturen und Theoriendynamik,
1985
- 3. Teilband: Die Entwicklung des neuen Strukturalismus
seit 1973, 1986
- Band III, Strukturtypen der Logik,1984
- Band IV, Personelle und statistische Wahrscheinlichkeit,
1973
- 1. Halbband: Personelle Wahrscheinlichkeit und
rationale Entscheidung, 1973
- 2. Halbband: Statistisches Schließen - Statistische
Begründung - Statistische Analyse, 1973
I should add
that I have read myself all or nearly all of this, and in the
form of the Studienausgäbe. Also, I should add that (1) I have
heard it said repeatedly - last century, to be sure - this work
had been or was being translated, but I cannot find it (2) I have
some later editions than those listed (3) volumes III and IV were
made in cooperation with others.
Anyway: These
volumes contain and explain the sort of thinking one should know
if one wants to or pretends to discuss science and its
foundations rationally.
3. Some links about psychiatry
I have had a very low opinion of psychiatry ever since I
bought and read, when 17, Patrick Mullahy's "Oedipus -
myth and complex" - which is, as it happens, a capable
introduction to the main schools of psychiatry that existed up to
the 1960ies.
My main two reasons to rapidly develop a very low opinion of
psychiatry were that at 17 I still could recall my childhood very
well, and I could verify none of the attributions Freud and other
psychiatrists made to me and anyone else, and that I then also
was quite capable of logical and rational thought, and found that
most that I read in Mullahy was neither logical nor rational in
my opinion - that I later found very strongly confirmed, both in
the academic study of psychology and the academic study of
philosophy.
To outline what I learned later, over and above what is
already in the present text, goes beyond the limits I have set
myself now, but since this started in fact in my abhorrence with
the DSM-5 - and see (for example)
I limit myself to some links to work by Richard Webster, who
wrote i.a. "Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science and
Psychoanalysis (Revised edition, Harper Collins 1996":
There is more interesting stuff about psychiatry in the links.
Also good, in various respects also, is Robert T. Carroll's
the Skeptic's Dictionary
-
Freudian
psychoanalysis (in the Skeptic Dictionary)
(Opening paragraph, first - pictorial - link added:)
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is
considered the father of psychoanalysis, which may be the
granddaddy of all
pseudoscientific psychotherapies, second only to
Scientology as
the champion purveyor of false and misleading claims about the
mind, mental health, and mental illness. For example, in
psychoanalysis schizophrenia and depression are not brain
disorders, but narcissistic disorders. Autism and other
brain disorders are not brain problems but mothering problems.
These illnesses do not require pharmacological or behavioral
treatment. They require only "talk" therapy. Similar positions are
taken for anorexia nervosa and Tourette's syndrome (Hines 1990:
136). What is the scientific evidence for the psychoanalytic view
of these mental illnesses and their proper treatment? There is
none. (Skeptic Dictionary)
-
Phil Parker Lightning ProcessTM
(in the Skeptic
Dictionary)
"His core principal [sic] is that
people
are geniuses with amazing skills, qualities and talents, and he
hopes he can help as many people as possible to find that out about
themselves. You can get Phil's latest thoughts, self-help tools and
videos for free from his podcast, blog, twitter and Facebook sites."
(LP site on PP)
See also:
-
Radboud Ziekenhuis Nijmegen -
Natural Home of
the Lying ProcessTM
- Get your
whee-whees cuddled...
- Of Bees, of Johnson, of Brain
Tapping and more
-
Dr. Esther Crawley is a genius
-
(New Age) psychotherapies (in
the Skeptic Dictionary)
"What is ‘be-ing’? It’s very simple - almost too simple; it's just
what it appears to be - it’s just be-ing - it’s the place present
just before thought… a place of stillness and peace that spiritual
practitioners (and philosophers) assert is who we really are - a
place of grace. When we are just be-ing in the moment things come
naturally….things they flow more…..If you’re an athlete and you
inhabit be-ing you’re a star…if you're unhealthy and you inhabit
being - you are at peace." (Cort Johnson)
See also:
-
Be your Be-ing for hav-ing
Wellness - Cort's Whee-Whee explained
Anyway.... here is the brief general formulaic description of
Fraudian psychoanalysis, Charcotian bogosity, Breuerian delusions
and posturing AND Reeves, Wessely's and Bleijenberg's lies,
postures and fraudulence:
Charcot eventually came to the conclusion that many of his
patients were suffering from a form of hysteria which had been
induced by their emotional response to a traumatic accident in
their past – such as a fall from a scaffold or a railway crash.
They suffered, in his view, not from the physical effects of the
accident, but from the idea they had formed of it.
Freud was immensely impressed by Charcot’s
work on traumatic hysteria and took from it the notion that one of
the principal forms of neurosis came about when a traumatic
experience led to process of unconscious symptom-formation....
(Richard Webster, on Freud and Charcot)
They called it over the past 130 years "hysteria", neurasthenia,
"conversion disorder", "psychosomatic", "somatisation disorder",
"complex" or "simple somatisation disorder", but the intellectual
and moral schema is every time precisely
the same psychiatric scam:
"We psychiatrists can't explain it, so
therefore you patients must be making it up"
The reason psychiatrists and psychotherapists say so and have said
so is that they are dishonest, pretentious, out for money, and far
less interested in your well being than they publicly claim they are;
the reason psychiatrists and psychotherapists can get away with it is
the same as religious scams are so often succesful: Mundus vult
decipi, especially where they fear things about which they are
ignorant.
Finally, there are good psychologists and psychiatrists, as
there are good people: In a minority, and often discriminated.
One way to recognize them by is that while they are clearly more
intelligent and erudite than most, they also do not pretend knowledge
they have not and indeed cannot have, the state of science being what
it is.
And see my A
realistic numerical look at human morality + 12 references.
P.S. Corrections have to be made later. And the
short summary is: You can not trust psychiatrists or
psychologists who lack a demonstrable ready knowledge of
philosophy of science and mathematics - especially not if they
make money from you, or expound their pseudoscience to the
public, 'educated' or not.
And if they have not read Stegmüller, or something comparable
(which there isn't, in four volumes, of that level of preciseness
and clarity), you can be morally certain they are bullshitting
you or deluding themselves - and the more intelligent ones are
certainly bullshitting you, if only because it is not that
difficult to see through and because they do make fine well
paying careers with it.
And this also applies to the editors of the DSM-5: Frauds
like Freud, I must conclude, having considered the evidence of
his and their published work.
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