Happiness: Well-being,
satisfaction, contentedness, joy, ecstasy.
There are various modes of and reasons for
happiness, but human beings widely though not universally have
agreed that it are forms of happiness that make life worthwile. Those
who did no agree on such a proposition usually did not do so because
they believed happiness is an illusion or because they supposed that it
is better to be morally good (in some sense) than to be happy.
1. Aristotelian happiness:
There is a fine book by Wladyslaw
Tatarkiewicz, "Analysis of Happiness" that is a serious,
well-written, intelligent and informative study of the concept and
opinions about it. To quote his analysis, which follows Aristotle
mostly:
"Happiness means lasting satisfaction.
Thus happiness has to be defined as 1) complete, 2) lasting, 3)
satisfying, and 4) touching the whole of life." (p. 8)
As Tatarkiewicz himself immediately proceeds to point
out, the problem is that none of these four marks have a high chance of
being satisfied in any one's life, or at least not to a large extent. As
he says:
"There is, however, a way out of this dilemma. A
distinction has only to be drawn between ideal and actual
happiness." (p. 9)
This is true and makes some sense, though on the whole
it seems the demand that happiness requires lasting satisfaction
touching the whole of life requires too much of "the whole of life", for
there are many chances for misfortune and misery in any human life.
2. Gibbon on happiness:
There is a lot that may be said about happiness and
misery. Here is
an instructive quotation from Gibbon's "The Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire" (in which one also may learn that "History
is little else but the register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes
of mankind"). It concerns an opinion of an Islamic caliph of Spain
of the house of the Ommiades, of ca. 800:
In the West the
Ommiades of Spain supported with equal pomp the title of
commander of the faithful. Three miles from Cordova, in
honour of his favourite sultana, the third and greatest
of the Abdalrahmans constructed the city, palace and
gardens of Zehra. Twenty-five years, and above three
million sterling, were employed by its founder: his
liberal taste invited the artists of Constantinople, the
most skilful sculptors and architects of the age; and
the buildings were sustained or adorned by twelve
hundred columns of Spanish and African, of Greek and
Italian marble. The hall of audience was encrusted with
the curious and costly figured of birds and quadrupeds.
In a lofty pavilion of the gardens of one of these
basins and fountains, so delightful in a sultry climate,
was replenished not with water, but with the purest
quicksilver. The seraglio of Abdalrahman, his wives,
concubines, and black eunuchs, amounted to six thousand
three hundred persons: and he was attended to the field
by a guard of twelve thousand horse, whose belts and
scimitars were studded with gold.
In a private condition
our desires are perpetually repressed by poverty and
subordination; but the lives and labours of millions are
devoted to a despotic prince, whose laws are blindly
obeyed, and whose wishes are instantly gratified. Our
imagination is dazzled by the splendid picture; and
whatever may be the cool dictates of reason, there are
few among us who would obstinately refuse a trial of the
comforts and the cares of royalty. It may therefore be
of some use to borrow the experiences of the same
Abdalrahman, whose magnificence has perhaps excited our
admiration and envy, and to transcribe an authentic
memorial which was found in the closet of the deceased
caliph.
"I have now reigned
above fifty years in victory or peace; beloved by my
subjects, dreaded by my enemies, and respected by my
allies. Riches and honours, power and pleasure, have
waited on my call, nor does any earthly blessing
appear to have been wanting to my felicity. In this
situation I have diligently numbered the days of pure
and genuine happiness which have fallen to my lot:
they amount to FOURTEEN; - O man! place not thy
confidence in the present world!""
Thus the text. Two obvious difficulties
are how one
defines "the
days of pure and genuine happiness" and next how one
counts and recognizes them, all in rational terms, next to
the problem that individual temperaments may differ a lot.
Gibbon also has, as often, a beautiful and personal note
to the above, of which I cite the end:
If I may speak of
myself (the only person of whom I can speak with
certainty), my happy hours have far exceeded, and
far exceed, the scanty numbers of the caliph of Spain;
and I shall not scruple to add, that many of them are
due to the pleasing labour of the present composition.
Gibbon seems to be right and it seems to
me that that there are probably good biological and
biochemical reasons, even if they are at the present stage
of knowledge largely unknown, why people, if they are free
from pain, free from hunger, free from fear, and have a
sound mind in a healthy body, therefore and thereby at
least will feel well (disregarding those born with a
melancholic constitution, as also happens). For if it were
otherwise, there would be many more human suicides then
there are.
In any case, this is a useful fact that
seems to hold for the fast majority of men: For those who
are free from pain, hunger, fear and memories of
suffering, life feels well.
3. Happiness and society:
One reason why happiness is quite important
politically,
socially,
religiously and
ethically is that
most of the "crimes and follies" of mankind (see above) are strongly
correlated with personal unhappiness: If you feel truly happy or
joyous, there is no felt reason to kill or persecute others (if you are
not a sadist).
- The harm, misery and suffering that
human beings cause other human beings tends to be caused by unhappy
human beings.
4. Happiness and pleasure:
According to J.S. Mill
"Happiness is desirable, and the only thing
desirable, as an end; all other things being desirable as means to
that end"
and
"Actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness"
These are the basic tenets of
Millsian utilitarian ethics. The second statement can be regarded as
a definition of "right action", and seems to presuppose the first
statement.
One problem with the first statement
is what happiness is, and for Mill the answer to that is that in
practice happiness comes down to
pleasure.
The further problem is then that while some pleasures seem worse than
other pleasures of precisely the same strength, the Millian approach
gives no logical means to explain that apparent fact, and indeed
logical reasons to deny the apparent fact.
Another problem is that happiness seems to be the feeling one
has if one believes one has reached some end one had, and that it is
thus not pleasure in general, but the specific pleasure connected with
success, and making an effort, and running risks.
This makes happiness a special kind of feeling related
to ends and actions: Any end one has poses a desire to be satisfied,
and to satisfy an end generally requires a series of actions and
decisions, all of which will have some risk of failing, and all of
which require some trouble and effort. The general feeling of
satisfaction one has when realizing an end one had accordingly falls
apart in the pleasures associated with the end, and the happiness
associated with succesfully reaching an end.
Upon this definition, happiness is not "the only
thing desirable", but merely the special feeling that accompanies
realizing some desire one has, that usually is proportionate to both the
importance one attaches to the end, and the trouble and risks one took
to reach the end. Also, on this view happiness is not desirable,
except in the sense that one desires to be successful in acting towards
ends, since it are the ends one has that are desirable for one,
while happiness is the feeling one has if one is successful in realizing
an end.
5. Happiness and power:
It seems that men (and women, and children) do not so
much want happiness as that they desire to do as they please: They want
to do as they desire, first and foremost, and often choose for pleasure,
but not necessarily so.
This was very well expressed by Sophocles:
"The fairest thing of all
is to be just;
The best to live without disease; most sweet
Power to win each day the heart's desire."
(Quoted in Bowra, "The Greek Experience", p. 92)
In a similar vein there
was the ancient Greek inscription at Delos:
Most noble is that
which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.
It is not happiness nor
pleasure that people seek, but
power - the
ability to do as they please when they please. And indeed, it is true
that the main motive for this is that power gives happiness, which need
not be pleasure but may be any feeling of well-being produced by seeing
an end one has satisfied.
It is noteworthy, not only logically
speaking, that this is second order, in the sense that it is a desire
about one's desires, and that it can be defined thus if one wants to
conflate happiness and power:
And obviously, since this is so for each
and all, and all seem to aim at happiness thus defined, it follows
cooperation
and
agreement are
necessary for human
society.
